A wrong war gone horribly wrong
"Today In Iraq" is an excellent blog for up-to-date news and opinions about Iraq. The author is a former officer of the Army who remained on active duty for 27 years, fought in the first Gulf War, and strongly opposed the latest war on Iraq. While he usually summarzies the day's events with links to news articles and editorials, several days ago he posted a letter which he wrote back to a pro-occupation critic who accused him of being "un-American."
What the letter helps to demonstrate is that even if a young person joins the military in the hopes of serving our country honorably, that person who becomes a soldier can end up being misused and abused as a result of faulty defense policies administered from the top of the political chain. While the Bush administration presses blindly forward with plans to build massive new weapons systems, including the failed "missile defense shield" which violates international law, it was widely reported a few months ago that the soldiers' Humvees in Iraq were not properly armored for combat. This was a widespread problem in which the vehicles were not even minimally protected against potential incoming fire. Nobody knows how many injuries or deaths that could have been prevented resulted from this travesty in military planning.
But there were even larger problems than that one. The neoconservative ideology and ignorance of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld led him to ignore military officials' advice on how to minimize casualties and properly bring peace to a post-invasion Iraq. The letter below delves into this issue in more detail, but to summarize, there was a debate before the invasion of Iraq about just how many troops were needed to successfully invade and occupy. Rumsfeld and his associates wanted to show that they could complete the mission with a small invading force, while established military officials including now-retired Gen. Shinseki insisted that at least 400,000 troops would be necessary to "secure the peace." Rumsfeld's position won out simply because he has more power over policy than anyone else, and the results have proved distasterous. The extreme instability and lawlessness in Iraq that followed immediately after Baghdad fell have given rise to the chaos that continues to this day. The relevant portions of the letter itself are below:
All of the mistakes involved in the Iraqi war planning could very well happen again if we were to invade Syria or Iran, or become involved in another conflict. The Marines and soldiers on the ground almost never have any direct control over how they are equipped and used in war. They are subject to the whims, and in the case of Iraq, ideologies of those who make wars: usually the warmongers themselves.
What the letter helps to demonstrate is that even if a young person joins the military in the hopes of serving our country honorably, that person who becomes a soldier can end up being misused and abused as a result of faulty defense policies administered from the top of the political chain. While the Bush administration presses blindly forward with plans to build massive new weapons systems, including the failed "missile defense shield" which violates international law, it was widely reported a few months ago that the soldiers' Humvees in Iraq were not properly armored for combat. This was a widespread problem in which the vehicles were not even minimally protected against potential incoming fire. Nobody knows how many injuries or deaths that could have been prevented resulted from this travesty in military planning.
But there were even larger problems than that one. The neoconservative ideology and ignorance of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld led him to ignore military officials' advice on how to minimize casualties and properly bring peace to a post-invasion Iraq. The letter below delves into this issue in more detail, but to summarize, there was a debate before the invasion of Iraq about just how many troops were needed to successfully invade and occupy. Rumsfeld and his associates wanted to show that they could complete the mission with a small invading force, while established military officials including now-retired Gen. Shinseki insisted that at least 400,000 troops would be necessary to "secure the peace." Rumsfeld's position won out simply because he has more power over policy than anyone else, and the results have proved distasterous. The extreme instability and lawlessness in Iraq that followed immediately after Baghdad fell have given rise to the chaos that continues to this day. The relevant portions of the letter itself are below:
After 27 years of active duty, I know a bit about US Army operational doctrine and force structure planning. You don’t make a deep attack on a strategic objective along a single axis of advance, and you always build your force structure with sufficient resources to protect your lines of communication during the campaign and to secure your objective after you’ve taken it. Despite the advice of the uniformed officers, Rumsfeld and his civilian political appointees (most of whom never served a day in uniform unless they were Boy Scouts or worked at Burger King) insisted on a minimal force structure and a single attack route to Baghdad.Youth Activists of Austin has been opposed to the illegal and immoral war and occupation of Iraq ever since they began in March of 2003. At least 100,000 Iraqi civilians have died because of our country's inexcusable actions in Iraq. More than 1,500 young men and women have died as well; a number that might have been far lower if the administration had taken the proper precautions, or alternatively, if it had withdrawn the troops by now and ended the occupation.
A brief review of the campaign might be helpful.
During the initial high-intensity combat phase of the campaign in March/April 2003, the 3d Infantry Division crossed the LD at the Kuwaiti border and attacked along the Euphrates river on a planned line of advance through Nasiriyah - Samawah - Najaf - Hilla - to the strategic objective of Baghdad. The attack stalled at Najaf, less from to Iraqi resistance than poor logistical support due to Rumsfeld’s faulty force structure. As a result, the US follow-on exploitation force, 1st Marine Division, swung right across Tigris river at Kut and attacked Baghdad from the east bank of the Tigris, drawing off defending Iraqi units from 3ID. Re-supplied, 3ID continued the attack and Baghdad fell.
Although 3ID and 1MD took Baghdad, they lacked the resources to secure Iraq. Weeks of looting, murder, rape, riot and disorder followed, all directly attributable to Rumsfeld’s failure to follow the advice of the professional officer corps. Before the war, General Shinseki, US Army Chief of Staff, warned Congress that a successful conquest and pacification of Iraq required at least 400,000 troops, would take a minimum of five years, and would cost $100 billion annually. Rumsfeld and his buddies went apeshit and a Republican Congress ignored the General. Paul Wolfowitz said GEN Shinseki was “wildly off the mark.” Larry DiRita said GEN Shinseki was a political partisan. Dougie Feith publicly called GEN Shenseki a liar. GEN Shinseki made the honorable decision to retire. No civilian political appointee from Rumsfeld’s office attended GEN Shinseki’s retirement ceremony, presumably just to spite an American officer who disagreed. They didn’t hear GEN Shinseki say, “Beware the twelve division strategy for a ten division Army.” The American people didn’t hear that waning either, because our media was too busy yapping about “shock and awe.”
Since the fall of Baghdad, the occupation has been bungled at every step. The troops have performed like professional soldiers and Marines. In my opinion, the performance of the Reserve Component has been particularly impressive. But the troops are being abused through back-to-back deployments, stop-loss, and involuntary recall.
All of the mistakes involved in the Iraqi war planning could very well happen again if we were to invade Syria or Iran, or become involved in another conflict. The Marines and soldiers on the ground almost never have any direct control over how they are equipped and used in war. They are subject to the whims, and in the case of Iraq, ideologies of those who make wars: usually the warmongers themselves.